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Abstract
With the rise of the electronic trading, corporate bond traders have access to data infor-
mation of past trades. As a first step to automation, they have to start monitoring their own
trades, and using past data to build a benchmark for the expected transaction costs with given
bond characteristics and market conditions. Given the limited liquidity of corporate bonds
which are traded few times daily, a statistical model is the only way to benchmark effective
costs. It brings focused attention of the dealing desk of an institutional investor on the most
costly trades, and enables identifying and improving business practices such as the market
timing for selection counterparties.
Unlike existing literature which focuses on general measurements using OLS, this paper
takes the viewpoint of a given investor, and provides an analytical approach to establish a
benchmark for transaction cost analysis in corporate bond tradings. Regularized methods are
used to improve the selection of explanatory variables, as fewer variables provide easier analytics
from a business perspective. This benchmark is constructed in two steps. The first step is
the regression analysis with cross validation to identify abnormal trades. Three regression
approaches, OLS, two-step Lasso and Elastic Net, are adopted to identify key features for the
bid-ask spread of corporate bonds. The second step is to use the non-parametric approach to
estimate the amplitude and decay pattern of price impact. A key discovery is the price impact
asymmetry between customer-buy orders and consumer-sell orders. This benchmark can aid
decision makings for retail investors when requesting quotes on the electronic platform.
Keywords: Bond liquidity, transaction costs analysis, riskless principal trades, price impact, Enhanced
TRACE, regression analysis, regularization method, data-driven decision making
1 Introduction
Corporate bonds are critical to firms financings, thus an important part of the asset management [Nagel, 2016].
In spite of the recent evolutions of regulations (e.g., the TRACE reporting system established in US since
June 2002, and MiFID 2 for electronic bond tradings in Europe since January 2018), trading of bonds is
far less transparent than that of equity shares [Bessembinder et al., 2008]. The macroprudencial regulatory
responses to the 2008 financial crisis demands more transparency on trading of corporate bonds to reduce in-
formation asymmetry between intermediaries (banks) and their clients [Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015].
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Regulation also leads to increase in capital requirement, which in turn prevents banks from taking large
inventories as before [Wilson et al., 2014]. This lower inventories, combined with the requirement of more
transparency, push banks and dealers towards flow driven business via electronification [Harris, 2015].
In this fragmented trading environment, asset managers, without the pricing tools and the private
databases that maker-dealers have, have to assess the quality of the execution of corporate bonds with
Transaction Costs Analysis (TCA) to prove the best execution of their tradings. Meanwhile, average in-
vestors, while benefiting from the decreases in average transaction cost (Section 2), face the daunting task
of estimating transaction costs from all the possible execution channels in fragmented markets: order books,
requests-for-quotes (RFQ), voice, dark pools, block discovery mechanisms, to name a few.
Our work. In this paper we take the viewpoint of an individual investor who would like to have a better
understanding of her execution performances. This is different from existing studies of average transaction
costs (Section 2). The goal is to establish a benchmark for TCA in bond tradings for retail investors, and
to provide an efficient methodology for such an investor to improve her TCA and to facilitate her decision
makings when she has to send an order to an electronic platform or to request quotes from dealers.
Our analysis on transaction costs uses the Enhanced TRACE database from 2015 to 2016, and consists
of two steps, corresponding to two different time scales. The first step (Section 4) explores several regu-
larized regression models to establish the “expected average cost” benchmark for a given corporate bond,
even in the absence of pre-trade transparency. This step is in the spirit of what [Engle et al., 2012] and
[Almgren et al., 2005] have done for equity markets. It allows to measure the difference between the trades
from the elapsed week and this expected-average-cost benchmark; it also allows an investor to identify
“abnormal trades”. It opens the door to forensic analysis on such anomalies. In statistical terms, it is
about identifying previous transactions with the least likely costs.
This construction of several models for the “expected cost of a trade” uses cross-validation to select
the most appropriate versions of the regression models via the choice of a penalization term (Section 4).
In addition to estimating bid-ask spread of corporate bonds, these regularized regression models allow for
identifying the most important features needed to compute efficiently the expected trading costs. The
selected features for corporate bonds are consistent with existing works: the volatility of the price of the
bond, the number of year since the issue of the bond, and the activities on the bond characterized by both
the number of trades and the traded amount (in dollars) per week. In addition, these two last features
are found to play two opposite roles: the larger the amount traded in dollars, the smaller the bid-ask
spread; and the more trades (for the same amount in dollars), the larger the the bid-ask spread. It is worth
mentioning that the R2 obtained in this paper ranges from 0.50 to 0.60, whereas the R2 in existing works
via regressions are very diverse: from 0.05 to 0.20 in [Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015], 0.30 to 0.50 in
[Edwards et al., 2007] or 0.50 to 0.80 in [Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012].
After the first step in identifying abnormally and bad transactions, the second step exposed in this paper
focuses on liquid corporate bonds is to investigate each trade and the amplitude of its price impact and
the price decay after the transaction. To conduct such a forensic analysis of bad transactions, we rely on
non-parametric statistics, and compare price changes around the trade to the “usual price changes around
a trade”. 1 Since the trading frequency is much lower on corporate bonds than on equities, it is necessary
to use hours for bonds instead of minutes adopted for equities. As a consequence, the averaged price impact
curves (Section 5) are noisier than the ones computed on equities. Nevertheless, a few important phases of
such curves are clear:
• a price jump when the trade occurs,
• a price decay after the initial jump,
1This approach of averaging price changes around a transaction has already been used on equity market data to
understand the behavior of high frequency traders. See Figure 6 and Figure 7 of [Biais et al., 2016] and Figure 2 and
Figure 3 of [Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019].
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• and the stabilization at a “permanent level”, higher than the initial price. This permanent impact
can be read as the informational content of the trade.
Another important finding in the second step analysis is the asymmetry of the amplitude of the initial price
jump: buy initiated transactions have more instantaneous impact that sell initiated transactions on corporate
bonds. This feature was also reported in the regression of Table IV of [Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015]
since the coefficients of the buy and sell orders are not of the same amplitude for over-the-counter (OTC)
trades (but not for electronic trades). They remarked that “Buy and sell orders need not to be symmetric,
especially in fixed income markets where many bonds are bought and held to maturity, limiting their float and
making short sales especially difficult”. Such an asymmetry was also reported in Figure 15 of [Mizrach, 2015]
and Table 1 of [Ruzza, 2016]. The former plots the yearly average price change after five trades from 2003
to 2015, the impact of buys seems to be around 25% more than the impact of sells; the latter exhibits that
the average price deviation between the price of a transaction and the average price of the day is of 56bp
to 33bp for institutional buyers and of -25bp to -21bp for institutional sellers on TRACE data from 2004
to 2012.
2 Background
Corporate bonds vs equities. Corporate bonds and equity shares are the two standard way for firms
to raise capital on public markets. However, they are fundamentally different.
First, the differences between those two instruments for investment purposes are clear from the classical
Merton’s model of the firm [Hull et al., 2005]: shareholders can see their investment value dropping to
zero in case of credit event, but they may be rewarded (via dividends or the rise of share price) by the
outstanding performance the firm; whereas bond owners, though having priority and less risk exposure in
case of credit events, will not be awarded according to the performance of the underlying firm except for a
flow of coupons.
Secondly, bonds and equity shares are different in terms of liquidity. Bonds have a fixed duration and
after the maturity the investor gets the initial capital and his relation to the firm ends. As a consequence,
corporate bonds are made to be bought and hold. In contrast, equity shares are made to be bought and
sold, hence are more liquid with faster capital reallocation and more transactions activities. Table 1 shows
the difference between bonds and shares in terms of liquidity, even with the same underlying firm.
Thirdly, equity shares and corporate bonds are different in terms of trading practice. Indeed, since the
Reg NMS in the US and MiFID 1 and 2 in Europe, the standard way to trade equity shares is via order
books available in multilateral trading facilities. In contrast, bonds are traded via bilateral mechanisms.
That is, when the dealing desk of an asset manager needs to trade bonds, she first requests quotes from
a small number, say one to five, of dealers. Afterwards, she chooses the “best price” according to various
criteria such as the price and the quantity [Fermanian et al., 2015]. In countries such as Italy where active
electronic platforms are available [Linciano et al., 2014], the dealing desk uses the order book on these
venues too. However, it is well documented that the bid-ask spread is larger on electronic markets than on
RFQ, especially for large sizes [Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015, Ruzza, 2016].
Finally, the difference in trading practice for bonds and equity shares leads to the major difficulty in
TCA for bonds: contrary to the equity tradings where bid-ask spread is an obvious and easy choice for the
benchmark, there is a dire lack of benchmark for bond tradings [Collins and Fabozzi, 1991].
The TCA. MiFID, introduced in January 2018 in Europe, imposes best execution obligation on any
investment firm executing orders on behalf of clients and in the US this best execution is explicitly demanded
to brokers only. Nevertheless, the dealing desks of large asset managers implement TCA everywhere in the
world, at least on a monthly basis, close to the generic recommendation of [Collins and Fabozzi, 1991,
Kissell et al., 2004]. The goal of such a TCA is to breakdown the costs according to brokers and execution
means (orderbooks, RFQ, voice, etc) to challenge their efficiency and to identify ways to improve the
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Table 1: Diversity of liquidity of equity shares and different corporate bonds on Google,
Microsoft, and Chevron in July 2015.
Google Microsoft Chevron
Stock Bond Stock Bond Stock Bond
(38259PAB8) (594918AW4) (166764AH3)
Out standing 349.84 173.34 7700 1500.00 1910.00 2250.00
(million) (Shares) (USD) (Shares) (USD) (Shares) (USD)
Coupon Rate - 3.625 - 3.625 - 3.191
Maturity Date - 19May2021 - 15Dec2023 - 24Jun2023
Daily avg number 20,188.75 3.85 127,464.44 14.15 43,729.30 11.80
Daily avg volume 494.36 0.544 1630.14 2.75 704.93 3.25
(million)
Avg price 534.84 108.20 47.56 106.13 106.67 102.19
(sd) 0.01 0.054 0.0004 0.046 0.0022 0.049
Avg trade volume 45,425.55 141,493.50 12,789.00 193,693.70 16,116.789 275,343.20
(sd) 1479.2 114,260.9 322.7 70,045.6 502.3 57,455.6
Spread 1.87 0.40 0.01 0.60 0.04 0.40
(sd) 0.0144 0.079 0.0003 0.059 0.0025 0.1355
Volatility 1.58 4.240 0.213 9.40 0.22 5.78
practices of the execution desk. The details of the TCA are then shared with the portfolio managers of the
investment firm for review of the state of market liquidity and to be used in the allocation and hedging
process [Albanese and Tompaidis, 2008].
Existing works on TCA of corporate bonds. Empirical studies dealing with transaction costs
of corporate bonds can be categorized in two groups: the pre-TRACE ones and the post-TRACE ones. In
the pre-TRACE era, it was difficult to obtain data and this period ended in 2002. Pre-TRACE studies
therefor used a large spectrum of datasets including the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) data [Bessembinder et al., 2006, Chakravarty and Sarkar, 2003], the Capital Asset International
(CAI) dataset [Schultz, 2001], and the Nyse archives [Chordia et al., 2005, Biais and Green, 2007]. The
post-TRACE trade reporting obligation entered in force in the US in July 2002, raising questions about
the impact of transparency on transaction costs. Because of the exogenous shock provided by the entry
of TRACE, a number of papers, [Goldstein et al., 2007, Ruzza, 2016, Bessembinder et al., 2008], focused
on the early years of its introduction, seeking to identify the effect of this transparency on costs. Another
family of post-TRACE papers addressed more recent topics, such as the influence of the use of electronic
and multilateral trading [Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015], or the decrease of borrowing costs from 2004
to 2007 [Asquith et al., 2013].
All these papers came to the similar conclusion that the trading costs of corporate bonds decreased
on average over the last twenty years. The main proxy for transaction cost in these paper was the (ex-
pected) bid-ask spread, either from the theoretical conclusions in [Glosten and Milgrom, 1985] or simply
viewing the bid-ask spread as the best proxy for a “roundtrip transaction cost” [Edwards et al., 2007].
Their main statistical approach was the Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to account for bond-
specific or context-driven variations. The explanatory variables in these papers [Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012,
Edwards et al., 2007, Goldstein et al., 2007, Eom et al., 2004], were the coupon, the maturity, the number
of years to maturity, the volatility, the risk free rate, the expected recovery rate of the company, the prob-
ability of default (proxied by the rating of the bond, typically “high yield” or “investment grade”). For
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instance, [Goldstein et al., 2007] took the logarithm of the size of the trade as an explanatory variable, and
[Edwards et al., 2007] took one over the size of the trade, the squared size of the trade, and the square root
of the time to maturity in their linear regressions. 2
Reference Dataset(s) Name(s) Period covered
[Schultz, 2001] CAI 1995-1997
[Chakravarty and Sarkar, 2003] NAIC 1995-1997
[Chordia et al., 2005] TAQ, ISSM (Nyse), GovPX 1991-1998
[Bessembinder et al., 2006] NAIC + TRACE 2001 ; 2002
[Goldstein et al., 2007] TRACE 2002-2004
[Biais and Green, 2007] Nyse Archives 1926-1930; 1943-1948
[Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012] TRACE 2003-2005
[Asquith et al., 2013] TRACE 2004-2007
[Friewald and Nagler, 2014] Labelled TRACE 2003-2013
[Mizrach, 2015] TRACE 2002-2007
[Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015] TRACE + MarketAxes 2011-2011
[Ruzza, 2016] TRACE 2004-2012
Table 2: Quick list of empirical papers on transaction costs of corporate bonds
Regularized regressions with cross-validation. The main statistical tools in this paper to obtain
an estimated benchmark for trading costs are regularized regressions. The main advantages of this approach
versus the standard linear regression are on stability and sparsity. Stability is necessary because statistical
models used as benchmarks for transaction costs need to perform well for historical data, and to exhibit
good out-of-sample performance. Moreover, sparsity lends more explainability to a regression model: the
fewer variables for the same level of accuracy, the easier to understand the model.
Statistical learning emerged with the seminal paper of [Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971]. It addressed
the use of statistics to model relationships between variables when the underlying model is unknown. Up
to this seminal paper, most of mathematical statistics focused on estimating parameters of a model under
the assumptions that the data have been generated by a noisy version of this model [Borovkov, 1998].
This evolution to machine learning enables approximation of any function at a chosen level of accuracy.
Yet its progress has met with various obstacles, one of which being potentially large out-of-sample errors.
Different techniques have been proposed for this out-of sample-error issue. The most popular one, the
cross-validation, is a sophistication of the bootstrap, relying on the Efron theorem [Gine´, 1997].3
Penalization started in statistics with the Akaike approach [Akaike, 1997], adding a penalty for each
variable in a model in the spirit of Occam’s razor: favoriting models with as fewest parameters as possible
for the same level of accuracy. Bayesians provided an alternative to regularized models, popularized by the
celebrated Bayesian Information Criterion [Kass and Wasserman, 1995].
More recently this mix of penalization and cross-validation gave birth to a series of regularized regres-
sion models: the Ridge regression based on smooth regularization [Hoerl and Kennard, 1970], the Lasso
regression leveraging on the sparsity provided by the L1 metric [Tibshirani, 1996a], and the EN regression
that is a mix of both [Zou and Hastie, 2005].
2Note that authors of [Biais and Green, 2007] do not perform any linear regression but rely on descriptive statis-
tics, probably due to the lack of explanatory variables available during this period.
3The Efron theorem states that the empirical variance of a bootstrapped statistic is an unbiased and asymptotically
efficient estimator of its intrinsic variance.
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3 The dataset: TRACE, Thomson Reuters and data pro-
cessing
As mentioned earlier, the main obstacle for econometric studies on corporate bonds is the lack of trans-
parency. In all available databases, some basic yet critical information, such as the best executed price for
bond tradings, is unavailable. Nevertheless, some information, though limited, are recorded in the TRACE
database, and have been used for empirical studies by [Dick-Nielsen, 2014] and [Harris, 2015]. TRACE, an
acronym for the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine, is the FINRA-developed mechanism that facili-
tates the mandatory reporting of OTC secondary market transactions in eligible fixed income securities. In
this paper, we will use the data from the Enhanced TRACE to understand the price formation of bonds.
The main difficulty to work with TRACE comes from the lack of information on the liquidity offer. For
example, there are neither quotes, nor bids price, nor asks price. In TRACE, only transactions are recorded,
together with the type of the transaction: dealer-to-dealer, dealer-to-customer, or customer-to-customer.
But volumes of the trade in TRACE are truncated: if the transaction volume is above one million dollars
for individual investor (or five million dollar for institutional trades), only the minimum between the real
size of the transaction and one million (or five million for institutional trades) is recorded.
To avoid the truncation issue, we will use instead the Enhanced TRACE database where data is available
with an 18 months delay [Harris, 2015]. We will use the untruncated transactions on Enhanced TRACE
along with other information to construct the estimation of bid-ask spread (Section 3.4). The data we use
is from January 1st 2015 to December 31st 2016, and obtained from Wharton WRDS. In this period, there
are 34,809,405 original trade reports, 390,193 reports of trade cancellations (approximately 1.1 percent of
all original trade reports), 497,249 corrected trade reports (about 1.4 percent), and 28,005 reports of trade
reversals. Trade reversals are transactions that have been changed after more than 20 days since they were
initially recorded. Occasionally there are multiple correction records for the same original trade and cancel
records that cancel previously corrected trades. We will address the data cleaning procedure below. There
are 54,885 CUSIP4-days spread over 656 calendar days, many of which are weekends and holidays. The
CUSIP-days are computed by counting all the trade days over all the CUSIP bonds.
In particular, for each transaction of a bond, one can recover from Enhanced TRACE the following
information:
• tbk: the timestamp for the k-transaction of bond b;
• P bk : the price of the k-transaction of bond b;
• V bk : the volume of the k-transaction of bond b;
• the side of the dealer-to-customer transaction: customer buy order or customer sell order.
We rely on Thomson Reuters to retrieve information on the bonds traded, such as the amount issued,
the coupon rate, the sector information, and rating information. Thomson Reuters also provides data on
the Libor and Overnight Indexed Swap rate.
3.1 Data filtering
The data cleaning procedure combines the approaches in [Dick-Nielsen, 2014] and [Harris, 2015], with the
following steps:
1. Remove canceled trades and apply corrections to ensure that only trades that are actually settled
are accounted for. After the removal of canceled trades and canceled corrections records, there are
32,931,539 trades.
2. Since both principal and agent in the dealer-to-dealer transactions will report their transaction to
FINRA (see [Dick-Nielsen, 2014]), remove the ones reported by agents. As a result, 2,095,934 (i.e.
6.36%) of the reports are removed, with 30,835,605 reports remaining after this step.
4CUSIP stands for Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures.
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3. Remove the transactions in unusual trading days such as weekends and holidays. Thus 5,753 (0.02%)
records are removed, with 30,829,852 reports left after this step.
4. Exclude all trade reports with execution time outside of the normal 8:00AM to 5:15PM ET trading
hours. Therefore, 745,619 (i.e. 2.4%) are removed, with 30,084,233 reports remaining after this step.
5. Remove all irregular trades with sales condition codes that indicate late reports, late reports after
market hours, weighted average price trades, or trades with special price flags. As a result, 583,157
(i.e. 1.9%) reports are removed, with 29,501,076 reports left after this step.
6. Remove trade reports with price below 10 (percentage points of 100). This price filter step excludes
217,321 (i.e. 0.74%) of the remaining trades, with 29,283,755 reports left after this step.
7. Select reports classified as corporate bonds in the dataset. Remove those reports with sub-product
indicators such as Mortgage Backed Securities Transactions. Consequently, 563,942 (i.e. 1.94%) of
the remaining reports are filtered out, with 28,719,813 reports left.
In total, about 17.50% reports are filtered out from the original Enhanced TRACE dataset. Among all
the remaining 28,719,813 records, 14,071,375 (i.e. 49%) are Dealer-to-customer trades and the remaining
14,648,438 (i.e. 51%) are trades between dealers. These statistics are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Data filtering procedure.
Removal (nbe) Removal (pct) Number left
Step 1
Keep settled trades 1,877,866 5.4% 32,931,539
Step 2
Keep trades reported by dealers 2,095,934 6.36% 30,835,605
Step 3
Keep business days 5,735 0.02% 30,829,853
Step 4
Keep opened hours 745,619 2.4% 30,084,233
Step 5
Keep regular trades 583,157 1.9% 29,501,076
Step 6
Keep compatible prices 217,321 0.074% 29,182,755
Step 7
Keep bonds only 563,942 1.94% 28,719,813
Selection LR
For bid-ask spread regression – – 4,371,363
Selection PI
For price impact curves – – 3,564,264
3.2 Bond selection for linear regression
The regression analysis includes two types of bonds: investment grade bonds and high yield bonds. The
investment grade bonds are selected from iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF and the
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high yield bonds are selected from the components of iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF.
There are 1,033 current holdings of the former, among which 536 bonds have more than one transaction
recorded in Enhanced TRACE during the time period of Jan 1st, 2015 to Dec 31, 2016. These 536 bonds
are selected in the regression analysis. There are 1,575 current holdings of the latter, 1485 of which have
transaction records during the same period. Moreover, there are 30 bonds that belong to both iShares
iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF and iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF.
The rating levels of all these 30 bonds have been adjusted since issuance. Hence there are total of 1,993
bonds in the regression analysis.
After data cleaning, there are 14,071,375 trading reports between dealers and customers. Even though
only 1,993 bonds are selected, these selected bonds consist of 31.05 % of the total filtered customer-to-dealer
reports. Table 3 reports this selection as “Selection LR”, and Table 4 reports the statistics of these selected
bonds. See also Table 14a and Table 14b for the statistics of RPTs and non-RPTs.
RPT stands for the Riskless principle trade. Detailed discussion on RPT is in Section 3.4. Our per-
centage of RPTs is lower than that reported in [Harris, 2015], partly because of different dataset with a
different time period. [Harris, 2015] used TRACE data from April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015. In addition,
in the TRACE data, the markers (“1MM+” and “5MM+”) for larger trades assign the same value to many
large trades. Finally, we only count the RPTs for a subset of bonds whereas [Harris, 2015] estimated the
PRTs for a larger set of bonds.
Total Investment Grade High Yield Bonds with rating changes
Number of trades 4,371,363 3,102,791 1,109,177 159,395
Number of Customer buy 2,549,932 1,834,873 623,839 91,220
Number of Customer sell 1,821,371 1,267,888 485,308 68,175
Total trading volume (billion) 3401.76 2438.26 850.46 113.04
Avg trading volume 778,202.926 785,834.74 766,775.08 709,163.43
Avg price 102.05 104.26 97.81 88.58
Prop Volume of Customer buy 55.3 % 56.8 % 51.7 % 58.2 %
Prop Volume of Customer sell 44.7 % 43.2 % 48.3 % 41.8 %
Table 4: Description of selected 1,993 bonds for regression (dealer-
customer trades).
3.3 Bond selection for price impact analysis
Among all the 1,993 bonds for regression analysis, the top-1000 traded bonds are selected to calculate the
price impact curves since the calculation requires higher trading frequency. Table 3 report this selection as
“Selection PI”, and Table 5 summarizes statistics of these 1,000 bonds. Note that among the 30 bonds with
rating level adjustment, 27 of them belong to the top-100 traded bonds. Table 15a and Table 15b report
the potential RPTs and non-RPT dealer-customer trades of the top-1000 traded bonds.
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Total Investment Grade High Yield Bonds with rating changes
Number of trades 3,564,264 2,524,116 889,666 150,482
Number of Customer buy 2,097,420 1,504,574 506,975 85,871
Number of Customer sell 1,466,844 1,019,542 382,691 64,611
Total trading volume (billion) 2333.10 1651.47 579.72 101.91
Avg trading volume 654,584.16 654,277.25 651,624.83 677,227.95
Avg price 101.12 103.44 96.89 88.06
Prop Volume of Customer buy 54.8 % 56.4 % 51.1 % 56.3 %
Prop Volume of Customer sell 45.2 % 43.6 % 48.9 % 43.7 %
Table 5: Description of selected 1000 bonds for regression (dealer-
customer trades).
3.4 Preliminary data analysis
To analyze price impact, there are several important quantities to estimate, the first one being to identify
the initiator of a transaction.
Identifying the initiator of a transaction and RPTs. For equity shares, the initiator of a trade,
say in a limit order book, is clearly the liquidity consumer. This is not the case for bond trading where a
trade is characterized by both the type of transaction (buy or sell) and who has initiated the trade.
[Harris, 2015] identified a significant fraction of transactions between dealers and customer as RPT
(riskless principal trade). This corresponds to the situation where the dealer has found two clients, and put
herself in between the transactions. As a consequence, it is not possible to recover the initiator of the RPT
as it is difficult to determine which of the two clients called first and hence who initiated the trades.
To identify the initiator of a bond trade, we rely on the Enhanced TRACE data to identify each trade
as either a buy or a sell type, assuming the client is always the liquidity consumer, and the dealer is always
the liquidity provider. We target to further assign to each trade a sign of +1 when it has been initiated by
a buyer, and -1 when it has been initiated by a seller. Our methodology is described in Appendix A.
After identifying all the potential RPTs, we consider the transaction initiated by the client. We define
the sign of the transaction bk as +1 (i.e., “buy”) if a client buys from a dealer, and 
b
k as −1 (i.e., “sell”)
if a client sells to a dealer. When it is not possible to determine the sign of a trade as in the above RPT
case, we will assign bk to be zero.
Bid-ask spread estimation. After identifying the trade, it is possible to estimate the bid-ask spread
ψbk, and hence the mid-price M
b
k for each transaction k of bond b, using the following methodology.
First find two consecutive trades which have opposite signs k+1 = −k with k 6= 0, and which are
sufficiently close in time (i.e., |tbk+1 − tbk| < ∆t), and define the estimate of the bid-ask spread as
ψbk+1 := (P
b
k+1 − P bk ) · bk+1.(1)
The mid-price at tk is then estimated by
(2) Mbk := P
b
k − bk+1
ψbk+1
2
.
In this paper, we choose ∆t = 5-minute because of the low trading frequency of the corporate bond market.
As a consequence, only 15.6% of the transactions are used to calculate the bid-ask spread among bonds
that are selected from Section 3.2.
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To check the reliability of these estimates as only 15.6% of the trades are used to compute them,
we compare the estimated bid-ask spread with the one computed using bid and ask quotes provided by
Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader (CBBT) for those bonds that are available in both CBBT and Enhanced
TRACE data set. CBBT is a composite price based on the most relevant executable quotations on FIT,
Bloomberg’s Fixed Income Trading platform. CBBT pricing source provides average bid-ask prices based
on executable quotes that are listed on Bloomberg’s trading platform. Its aim is to indicate where clients
can reasonably expect to execute on the platform during trading hours, and prices are updated as dealer
levels change. [Fermanian et al., 2016] used the CBBT data as a measure of bond liquidity. We only have
access to quote price data from Bloomberg CBBT from June 1st, 2015 to May 31, 2016 (12 months) for
2,361 investment grade bonds that belong to the iboxxIG universe. The iboxxIG universe is the standard
universe for U.S. investment grade corporate bond. Among these 2,361 bonds, we identified 1,401 bonds
which have records in both Bloomberg CBBT database and Enhanced TRACE subset.
Figure 1 below shows the plot for the empirical distribution of the spread from CBBT and the estimated
spread from Enhanced TRACE for two arbitrarily chosen bonds, whose statistics are reported in Table 6.
It is noticeable (and expected) that the CBBT spreads are larger than the estimated ones from real trades
available in Enhanced TRACE. [Fermanian et al., 2016] pointed out, CBBT bid-ask spread estimates are
based on quotes, and not on real transactions, as a consequence they include quotes that are not attractive
enough (i.e. not small enough) to trigger a transaction. Since the bid-ask spread is the first component of
implicit transaction costs, trades occur when they are smaller than the average bid-ask spread.
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Figure 1: Empirical distributions of the spread.
Coupon Amount outstanding Average spread (bp) Daily average
number of updates
(USD) CBBT TRACE CBBT TRACE
US375558BG78 4.6% 1,000,000,000 118.78 66.24 2336.49 1.63
US126650CJ78 2.8% 2,750,000,000 45.12 29.88 3406.20 11.50
Table 6: Spread comparison.
Bid-ask spread stationarity. We next check the consistency of the two approaches via a stationarity
test on the ratio of the two estimates: the CBBT bid-ask spread and our trades-based estimates. That is,
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we split the year 2016 by two consecutive months and check if this ratio is stationary from one period of
two months to the other.
Denote ψCBBTb,w as the average spread for bond b over the period w taken from Bloomberg CBBT, and
ψTRACEb,w as the average of the estimated bid-ask spread for bond b in period w from Enhanced TRACE.
First of all, note that the empirical estimate of the bid-ask spread using Enhanced TRACE transactions
are smaller than the CBBT ones, the average ratio is between 0.9 and 1 and its median is between 0.7
and 1. The statistics of the ratios are summarized in Table 7. We use two tests for the stationarity of
the statistic Rb,w = ψ
CBBT
b,w /ψ
TRACE
b,w from one period w to the other w + 1. The first is one-way ANOVA
test, and the second is Kruskal-Wallis H-test. The former tests the stationarity of the mean and the latter
tests the stationarity of the median. The mathematical formulations and definitions of ANOVA test and
Kruskal-Wallis H-test are in Appendix B.
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of observations 1027 823 820 847 890 892
25% 0.7165 0.655 0.647 0.666 0.655 0.643
Median 0.971 0.931 0.899 0.900 0.852 0.873
75% 1.238 1.213 1.224 1.182 1.144 1.19
Mean 0.970 0.956 0.951 0.941 0.920 0.931
Month 6 7 8 9 10 12
Number of observations 939 914 1069 1062 1040 1047
25% 0.705 0.717 0.670 0.643 0.598 618
Median 0.963 1.000 0.893 0.830 0.779 0.834
75% 1.289 1.309 1.182 1.090 1.056 1.130
Mean 0.994 1.019 0.941 0.889 0.854 0.893
Table 7: Statistics of the ratios.
Month 1 and 2 2 and 3 3 and 4 4 and 5 5 and 6 6 and 7
ANOVA 4.59 0.10 0.39 1.71 0.52 15.32
(P-value) 0.032 0.751 0.533 0.191 0.472 0.000
H-test 3.564 0.163 0.154 1.890 0.296 15.16
(P-value) 0.038 0.686 0.6947 0.169 0.586 0.000
Month 7 and 8 8 and 9 9 and 10 10 and 11 11 and 12
ANOVA 2.21 25.54 14.15 6.72 7.81
(P-value) 0.136 0.000 0.0001 0.01 0.005
H-test 2.30 23.78 12.03 8.54 5.82
(P-value) 0.129 0.000 0.0005 0.003 0.015
Table 8: Results of ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis H-tests.
Table 8 summarizes the result of both ANOVA test and Kruskal-Wallis H-test. For most of the tests,
with 99% confidence level, we accept the null hypothesis in both ANOVA test and Kruskal-Wallis tests for
7 out of the total 11 comparisons. This implies a good stationary property of the ratios over time.
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We will thus use our estimation of the bid-ask spread in all the following, because it can be operated
over years of data using Enhanced TRACE, where CBBT is costly to obtain and linked to a private
procedure owned by Bloomberg. Nevertheless, these stationarity tests imply that a large investor using
CBBT estimates could rely on the methodology presented thereafter and apply a ratio to read our results
in terms of “units” of CBBT.
4 Estimate expected bid-ask spread via regularized regres-
sions
We will first review the basics of regularized regression, along with the notations to be used in the subsequent
analysis for expected bid-ask spread.
4.1 Background: regularized regression
In general, regression models involve the following parameters and variables: the unknown parameters,
denoted as θ, which may represent a scalar or a vector; the independent predictor variables, X (in this
paper it will be a list of characteristics of the bonds and some market context variables); and the dependent
variable, Y (in this paper it will be the bid-ask spread) . Regression analysis focuses on the relationship
between the dependent variable Y and the independent variables (or ’predictors’) X , i.e., the regression
function f such that Y = fθ(X ).
OLS. OLS is the most well known linear regression approach. It assumes that the regression function is
of a linear form and is defined in terms of a finite number of unknown parameters. The parameters are to
be estimated from data and to be determined by the smallest residual sum of square (RSS) or the mean
square error (MSE). That is, given Y := (y1, y2, · · · , yn) ∈ Rn the vector of n observations of independent
variables, and X := (1,x1, · · · ,xw−1) the covariates with 1 ∈ Rn and xi ∈ Rn (i = 1, 2, · · · , w − 1), the
least square estimator is to find
θˆ := arg min
θ∈Rw
{
‖Y −Xθ‖22
}
,(3)
OLS provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients.
Performance criteria for OLS: R2, T-statistics and p-value. In an OLS, R2 measures the
goodness of fit for the model and the p-value indicates the level of the significance of the feature. Here
R2 =
∑n
i=1(yˆi − y¯)2∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
,(4)
where yi is the true value of the i
th response value, y¯ =
∑n
i=1 yi
n
, and yˆi is the prediction from the model
given the ith observation xi (i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
Let θˆ be an estimator of parameter θ in some statistical model. Then a t-statistic for this parameter is
any quantity of the form
tθˆ =
θˆ − θ0
s.e.(θˆ)
,
where θ0 = 0 in our case and s.e.(θˆ) is the standard error of the estimator θˆ for θ0 .
The p-value for each covariate tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero (no effect), it
quantifies the idea of statistical significance of evidence. A low p-value (< 5%) indicates that one can reject
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the null hypothesis. In other words, a predictor that has a low p-value is likely to be a meaningful addition
to the model because changes in the predictor’s value are related to changes in the response variable.
In general, the higher the R2 value, the better fit the model; and the lower the p-value, the more relevant
the feature. Although R2 is useful for measuring good statistical fit, high R2 does not necessarily mean a
good model and does not address the issues overfitting or variance control. For example, overfitted models,
though with excellent R2 values, may capture noises or random errors instead of essential relations between
Y andX , Similarly, p-value is not sufficient for selecting variables, as selected variables with similar p-values
could be dependent.
Shrinkage of regression analysis. With the limitation of R2 and p-value, variable or feature selec-
tion is crucial for improving model accuracy and for avoiding overfitting. Variable selection is to choose
appropriate numbers of predictors from the total of w variables. This is a complicated problem in regression
models and there are many conflicting views on which type of variable selection procedure is best. One of
the most popular approach for variable selection is the shrinkage method. By introducing different forms of
penalty functions to the OLS regression, shrinkage methods aim to reduce the values of the coefficients thus
leading to a smaller variance of the model. The most widely used shrinkage methods are Ridge regression
[Horel, 1962], the Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator (Lasso) regression [Tibshirani, 1996b], and
EN regression. All these three methods add penalty functions to the linear regression, with L2 for Ridge
or L1 for Lasso, and a combination of both for EN. The introduction of penalty functions increases the
flexibility of the model and reduces the variance.
Lasso. Lasso places a particular form of constraint on the parameters θ in regression models. In the
linear regression model, the Lasso θˆλl is chosen to solve the following optimization problem
min
θ∈Rw
{
1
N
‖Y −Xθ‖22 + λ
w−1∑
j=1
|θj |
}
.(5)
Here λ is a fixed constant, called the hyperparameter. The above optimization problem is the so-called
Lagrangian form to minθ∈Rw 1N ‖Y −Xθ‖22, subject to
∑w−1
j=1 |θj | ≤ C for some constant C > 0. From
a Bayesian view point, Lasso can be viewed as a linear regression model for which the coefficients have
a Laplace prior distribution. The objective function in Lasso is convex but not quadratic. There is no
analytical solution because of the nonlinearity in Y . One can solve the above optimization algorithm
through various convex algorithms including the Least Angle Regression algorithm [Efron et al., 2004].
As in all regression models, the value of the hyperparameter in Lasso controls both the size and the
number of coefficients: higher value of λ leads to a smaller number of covariates in the linear model. In
particular, the constraint in Lasso is of an L1 form, which has “corners”. Thus, when the hyperparameter
λ is large, some of the coefficients are driven to zero, leading to a “sparse” model from Lasso. Since Lasso
tends to drive coefficients towards zero, it is a biased estimator.
To reduce this bias of Lasso, one may adopt the two-step Lasso estimation procedure.
Two-step Lasso. The first step in the two-step Lasso is to use the Lasso regression to select the
covariates. In the second step, the OLS with only the selected covariates is applied. This second step is
called post-Lasso OLS [Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2013], where given the Lasso estimator θˆλl in (5), the
subsequent OLS refitting is to find θ¯λl such that
θ¯λl ∈ arg min
supp[θ]=supp[θˆλ
l
]
{
‖Y −Xθ‖2
}
.(6)
We call θ¯λl the estimator for the LSLasso (least-squares Lasso), also known as post-Lasso. This two-step pro-
cedure is very popular as it has smaller bias than the Lasso for a range of models [Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2013],
[Lederer, 2013] and [Che´telat et al., 2017].
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Ridge regression. Similar to Lasso, Ridge regression is a shrinkage approach for linear regression.
In contrast to Lasso, the penalty term in the Ridge regression is of an L2 norm. That is, for a fixed
hyperparameter λ, Ridge regression is to solve for
θˆλr ∈ arg min
θ∈Rw
{
1
N
‖Y −Xθ‖22 + λ
w−1∑
j=1
θ2j
}
.(7)
As such, it shrinks the coefficients towards zero. This introduces some bias, but can greatly reduce the
variance, resulting in a better MSE. Ridge regression can be viewed as a linear regression for which the
coefficients follow a normal prior distribution. It improves predication accuracy by shrinking the size of
regression coefficients in order to reduce overfitting. However, unlike Lasso, Ridge regression does not set
the coefficients to zero, therefore it neither performs covariate selection nor improves interpretability of the
model.
EN regression. EN regression, introduced in [Zou and Hastie, 2005], is a hybrid of Lasso and Ridge.
That is, for a fixed hyperparameter (λ, α), EN is to solve for
θˆλe ∈ arg min
θ∈Rw
{
1
N
‖Y −Xθ‖22 + αλ
w−1∑
j=1
|θj |+ (1− α)λ
w−1∑
j=1
θ2j
}
,(8)
where α ∈ [0, 1].
Cross-validation. In regression models such as Lasso, Ridge, and EN, in order to select the hyperpa-
rameters, one usually adopts the K-fold cross-validation to improve the predictive power of the model. In a
K-fold cross-validation, the data set is randomly divided into K subsets. Each time, one of the K subsets
is used as the test set and the remaining K − 1 subsets form a training set. In this approach, every data
point gets to be in a test set exactly once and in a training set K − 1 times. The variance of the resulting
estimate is reduced as K increases. The disadvantage of this method is that the training algorithm has to
be rerun from the scratch K times, meaning it takes K times as much computation for one evaluation.
4.2 Data analysis via regularized regressions
We will now apply the OLS, the two-step Lasso, the Ridge, and the EN regressions for the data analysis,
along with a K-fold cross-validation method to pick the optimal parameters for each model.
Features and response variables. In Section 3.2, we select 1, 993 bonds and use Enhanced TRACE
data over 24 months from January 2015 to December 2016. For the regression analysis, we only focus
on the trades between customers and dealers. (Trades between dealers are statistically different from the
dealer-to-customer trades; moreover, analysis is infeasible since there is no indication as to who initiates
dealer-to-dealer trades.)
The regression analysis is performed on a weekly frequency. For each week, we calculate the averaged
estimated spread ψ by method in Eqn. (1) for every bond as the response variable. There are total 152, 408
data in this regression analysis.
The features in the regression come from two categories. One category concerns bond information,
including time to maturity date, time since issued date, coupon rate, amount outstanding, and duration.
The other category focuses on time sensitivity, including average transaction price, volatility, proportion of
costumer-buys (sells), LIBOR-OIS rate, and 5-year treasury rate during the given week. More specifically,
for each bond b in week w:
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• Bid-ask spread: the spread at t is defined as sbt = (P ab (t)− P bb (t))/Pmb (t) in bp, where P bb (t),
P ab (t), and P
m
b (t) are the bid, ask and mid price of bond b at time t, respectively. Since we have no
information of bid/ask prices on corporate bond market, an approximation method is introduced to
estimate the spread in Section 3.1. We calculate the weekly average spread for each bond b in week
w.
• Volatility: volatility is calculated by using the trade price. For bond b, assume there are n trades in
week w. Recall P bj as the trade price of the j
th transaction (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n) of bond b. Denote the
log return rbi = ln(
P bi
P bi−1
) (i = 2, 3, . . . , n) and the average return r¯b =
∑n
i=1 r
b
i/n. Then the annually
normalized volatility in week w is
σb =
√√√√ 1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
(rbi − r¯b)2 ·
√
250 · 100.
Notice that n may vary from bond to bond and from week to week.
• Number of trading days: the number of days that bond b is traded during the week.
• Log(zero trade days): the log of the number of days that bond b is not traded during the week.
• Proportion of buy/sell number: counting the number of customer-buy orders and number of
customer-sell orders in week w and calculating the proportion of buys and sells for each bond b.
• Proportion of buy/sell volume: taking the total volumes (in dollars) for customer-buy orders
and customer-sell orders in week w and calculate the the proportion of buys and sells for each bond
b.
• Trading activity: the log of the number of trades in the week.
• Total volume: the total volume is the weekly total trading volume in dollars of both customer-dealer
trades and dealer-dealer trades.
• Average price: the weekly average trade price in dollars.
• Coupon: annual coupon payments paid by the issuer relative to the bond’s face or par value. The
coupon rate is the yield the bond paid on its issue date. This yield changes as the value of the bond
changes, thus giving the bond’s yield to maturity.
• Duration: an approximate measure of a bond’s price sensitivity to changes in interest rates which
is defined as
Db =
∑
t
PV(Cbt )∑
t PV(C
b
t )
× t,
for bond b, where Cbt is the cash flow on date t, PV (C
b
t ) is its present value (evaluated at the bond’s
yield), and
∑
t PV(C
b
t ) is the total present value of the cash flows, which is equal to the bond’s current
price.
• Years to maturity: the time to maturity date calculated in years.
• Years since issuance: the time since issued date counted in years.
• Amount outstanding: the principal amount outstanding of a bond and is sometimes referred to
as the notional amount.
• Turnover: the volume of bonds available for trade relative to the total volume of outstanding
bonds.
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• LIBOR-OIS rate: the term London inter-bank offer rate (LIBOR) is the rate at which banks
indicate they are willing to lend to other banks for a specified term of the loan. The term overnight
indexed swap (OIS) rate is the rate on a derivative contract on the overnight rate. The term LIBOR-
OIS spread is assumed to be a measure of the health of banks because it reflects what banks believe
is the risk of default associated with lending to other banks. In this analysis, we use the 1-month
LIBOR-OIS rate to indicate the bank health condition over time.
• Indicator of high yield (HY) or investment grade (IG) bond: indicator of whether the bond
is HY or IG.
• Indicator of different sectors: indicators of nine different sectors: basic materials sector (S1),
communications sector (S2), consumer & cyclical sector (S3), consumer & non-cyclical sector (S4),
energy sector (S5), financial sector (S6), industrial sector (S7), technology sector (S8), and utilities
sector (S9).
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics of response variables and features.
Mean std. q-25% Median q-75%
Bid-ask spread (bp) 68.79 69.1 23.14 45.82 90.91
Volatility (%/year) 12.41 9.21 6.13 10.21 16.43
Trading activity 1.28 0/35 1.04 1.26 1.51
Log($ traded volume) 6.90 0.63 6.50 6.94 7.33
Nbe trading days 4.41 0.80 4.00 5.00 5.00
Log(zero trade days) 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.30
Prop. nbe buy 0.45 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.57
Prop. nbe sell 0.55 0.18 0.43 0.55 0.67
Prop. $ buy 0.49 0.25 0.32 0.50 0.66
Prop. $ sell 0.51 0.25 0.34 0.51 0.69
Avg. price 103.69 10.93 100.06 102.87 107.93
Coupon 4.69 1.78 3.38 4.65 5.93
Duration 5.72 4.21 2.75 6.0 8.0
Years to maturity 8.23 7.91 3.0 6.0 8.0
Years since issuance 3.99 2.93 2.0 3.0 5.0
Turnover (×10−2) 1.80 6.10 0.30 0.80 1.90
LIBOR-OIS 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.25
Mean std. Mean std.
High yield 0.27 0.44 Invest. grade 0.73 0.44
S: Basic Material 0.03 0.18 S: Communications 0.15 0.38
S: Consumer, Cyclical 0.11 0.31 S: Consumer, Non-cyclical 0.14 0.35
S: Energy 0.16 0.37 S: Financial 0.27 0.44
S: Industrial 0.07 0.25 S: Technology 0.07 0.25
S: Utilities 0.01 0.11
Table 9: Statistics of the response variable and the features.
Hyperparameter selection. Specific to the regression models aforementioned, denote µ as the pa-
rameter for one of the regression models (for example, µ = (λe, α) for EN). We use partition in log-scale for
m different hyperparameter values for µ, and divide the data into K folds and run K-folds cross-validation.
For each leave-out fold i (the test set), we calculate the out of sample R2i (µ). Hence for each λ, we have
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an empirical distribution of R˜2(µ) = {R2i (µ), i = 1, 2, · · · ,K}. Denote R̂2(µ) and σR2(µ) as the mean and
standard deviation of the empirical distribution with parameter µ. Define the confidence interval by
I1(µ) =
[
R̂2(µ)− σR2(µ)√
K
, R̂2(µ) +
σR2(µ)√
K
]
.(9)
We will pick the µ such that the number of R˜2(µ) in I1(µ) is maximized. Moreover, define
I2(µ) =
[
R̂2(µ)− σR2(µ), R̂2(µ) + σR2(µ)
]
.(10)
Note that I2(µ) in (10) is a relaxation of I1(µ) in (9). When the number of {R2i (µ)} is not sensitive to
µ in I1(µ), one can compare I2(µ) instead.
4.3 Results from least square regression
The estimation result is reported in Table 10. All but two of the estimated coefficients are statistically
significant at any reasonable level of significance, which is not surprising because the sample size is large
and we have strong prior information on related features. The two exceptions are year to maturity and
turnover.
• The coefficients of Prop number of buys and Prop number of sells have the same sign but different
values. The coefficient of Prop number of buys is roughly one third of the coefficient of Prop number
of sells. Similarly, both of the coefficients of Prop buy volume and Prop sell volume are positive.
The coefficient of Prop buy volume is roughly half of the coefficient of Prop sell volume. This shows
the asymmetric between customer buy orders and customer sell orders. It has been documented in
numerous studies [Fermanian et al., 2016] that dealers offer tighter quotes to larger trades than to
smaller ones.
• The Avg price has a small effect on the bid-ask spread.
• The indicators of different sectors have different coefficients but the overall values are small.
• The Log(Total volume) coefficient is negative as expected. At round -21, the estimated coefficient
implies that a 10000-bond increase in trade size in contracts, which would make a retail-size trade
into a large institutional-size trade, and would reduce the bid-ask spread by 100 bps.
• The Indicator of investment grade bonds coefficient is negative and the Indicator of high yield bonds
coefficient is positive. This is consistent with the well documented empirical findings: larger spreads
for high yield bonds and smaller spreads for investment grade bonds.
Clearly, many of the bond features are potentially correlated. Hence we will continue the regression
analysis using Lasso. In fact in order to remove the bias from Lasso, we will use the two-step Lasso model.
4.4 Results from two-step Lasso regression
In this analysis, we pick 20 different values of µ = λl with partition in the range of [10
−1, 103] in the log
scale. Note that the ranges of hyperparameters are different for two-step Lasso, Ridge and EN. This is
because different models are sensitive to different ranges. The choice of interval [10−1, 103] can bee seen
from Figure 4. We select the range in which the model is sensitive by searching with a larger partition grid
in advance, this is partially revealed in the figures of cross-validation scores for different regressions. See
Figures 4, 5, and 6.
Figure 4 shows the 25%, 50% and 75% percentiles of out-of-sample R˜2 with different λl values. One
can see that all three 25%, 50% and 75% curves decrease fast before λ∗l = 2.98 and tend to be flat after λ
∗
l .
Also, both I1(λl) and I2(λl) are large when λl = λ
∗
l . Hence λ
∗
l is a good choice of regularization level.
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Table 16 shows λl’s along with I1(λl) and I2(λl), in which the number of R˜
2 are the largest, respectively.
Table 11 shows the features selected from the first step of the two-step the Lasso, with corresponding
parameters λ∗l = 1.13, 2.98, and 7.85, respectively. It also shows the models from the OLS regression in the
second step of the two-step Lasso. For instance, in Model L2 of Table 11 with λ∗l = 2.98, the model is of
the form with four features such that
Bid-ask spread = 5.28×Volatility + 39.07× Trading activity
− 19.45× Log(Total volume) + 0.23× Issued years + 86.
In addition, we see from Table 11,
1. The coefficient of Volatility is positive with value 5.28. This is consistent with the literature. Market
microstructure theories predicted that higher return volatility increases illiquidity (e.g., [Stoll, 1978]).
This relationship between asset liquidity and return volatility has been studied extensively both
theoretically and empirically.
2. The coefficient of Issued years is positive with value 0.23, which means a newly issued bond will have
a small bid-ask spread. This is consistent with the literature. [Konstantinovsky et al., 2016] argued
that recent and large issues are cheaper to trade than seasoned and small ones, so bond age and
issue size matter. High-risk securities (i.e., bonds with wide spreads to Treasuries) tend to be more
expensive to trade than low-risk ones.
3. The number of trades per day N and the trade volume V (in dollars) are suggesting a relation-
ship N/
√
V as a combined impact on the bid-ask spread in bp. For more detailed analysis of this
relationship, see Section 4.7.
[Chacko et al., 2005] found that credit quality, the age of a bond, the size of a bond issue, the original
maturity value of a bond at issuance date, and provisions such as a call, put, or convertible options all have
strong impact on liquidity, which supports our findings.
Finally, λl = 7.85 leads to the features: Volatility and Issued year in model L3. Compared to model L2
with four features and R2 = 51.5%, the R2 in EN3 drops to 43.22%. We prefer a model of four features,
which is already a decent reduction from 26 features, with higher power of explaining than EN3.
4.5 Results from Ridge regression
In this analysis, we pick 20 different values of λr using partition in the log scale in the range of [10
2, 108].
Figure 5 shows the 25%, 50% and 75% percentiles of out-of-sample R˜2 with different λr values. One
can see that all three 25%, 50% and 75% curves start to decrease at λ∗r = 1.27 · 106. Hence 1.27 · 106 is a
good choice of regularization level.
Table 17 shows λr’s along with CI(λr) and CI2(λr), in which the number of R˜
2 are the largest,
respectively. Table 12 shows the results of Ridge regressions with parameters λ∗r = 1.62 · 104, 6.95 · 104 and
1.27 · 106.
The analysis by the Ridge regression is consistent with the findings from the two-step Lasso. In partic-
ular,
• The table shows that, when λr goes up, the coefficients of the following features go to 0 very fast:
Indicator functions of different sectors, Proportion of volume (or number) buys (or sells), Turnover ,
and Number of trading days). Note that from Table 12 these features are also excluded from Model
L3 and L4 of Table 11, which means that results from these two approaches are consistent.
• When λr takes a large value 6.95 · 104, the Volatility, the Issued years, the Trading activity and the
Log(Total volume) are still significant. This is also consistent with the findings from Lasso in Table 11.
• Both two-step Lasso and Ridge regressions point to the significance of time value and special structure
of bonds. The variable years since issuance is significant in two of the two-step Lasso models: L1
and L3, and all three Ridge regression models.
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The difference between Lasso and Ridge regression is that: Avg price is not significant in all three two-step
Lasso models whereas it is significant in all three Ridge models. This inconsistency is expected because
of the collinearity among features. When features are correlated, Lasso tends to select one feature from a
group of correlated features. On the contrary, Ridge encourages grouping effect. That is, ridge tends to
penalize the group of correlated features towards the same coefficients [Zou and Hastie, 2005]. This can be
seen in Model R1, R2 and R3: the coefficients of Prop number of buys and Prop number of sells have the
same value but with different signs; the coefficients of Prop buy volume and Prop sell volume also have the
same value but with different signs. Additionally, the reappearance of Avg price in Model EN3 is due to
this group effect too.
4.6 Results from Two-step EN regression
Figure 6 shows the 25%, 50% and 75% percentiles of out-of-sample R˜2 with different λe values given different
α = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8. When (α, λe) = (0.5, 10
3) and (α, λe) = (0.8, 10
3), more than 170 empirical R˜2 falls
into I2. This is because the hyperparameter penalizes the model too much such that all the coefficients
are close to zeros and the empirical R˜2 are close to zeros. Hence these sets of hyperparameters should be
excluded.
Instead, we will select (α, λe) = (0.5, 0.774), (α, λe) = (0.8, 2.15), and (α, λe) = (0.5, 129) for the
analysis. Parameter (α, λe) = (0.8, 2.15) leads to the set of features: Volatility, Number of trades, Log(Total
volume) and Issued year. This is consistent with the feature selection in two-step Lasso model L2. (α, λe) =
(0.5, 129) leads to the features: Volatility and Average price in model EN3. Compared with model EN2
with four features and R2 = 51.5%, the R2 in EN3 drops to 42.62%. Similar to the argument for L3, we
prefer model EN2 with four features instead of EN3.
From all three different methods, we can see the consistency that Volatility and Issued years are impor-
tant in every model.
4.7 Conclusion: main features of the bid-ask spread of corporate bonds
We have performed different linear regressions explaining the bid-ask spread using two kinds of variables:
one describing the bond and the other characterizing the market context. We use different penalization
methods (Lasso, Ridge, EN) to select variables that are more meaningful, going beyond standard OLS.
Tables 10 to 13 give the results and compare them with an OLS. Since these results have penalization
parameters, we provide results for three meaningful levels of penalization, each time we recommend to keep
the “version 2” of the models: L2 for Lasso, R2 for Ridge and EN2 for EN regression.
These regressions allow to compute an “expected bid-ask spread” for a given week, to be used as a
benchmark cost for TCA. Main results are:
• The volatility is an important feature, as expected by empirical observations and the theory: the
larger the volatility, the larger the bid-ask spread. Practically we observe that an increase of 5% of
the volatility (that is 1/2 of its standard deviation on our dataset) corresponds to an increase of the
bid-ask spread by 25bps (which is around one third of its standard deviation).
• The number of trades per day N and the traded volume V (in dollars) are both important variables
(in log units), with coefficient suggesting that N/
√
V is the feature impacting the bid-ask spread in
bp.5 This implies that:
– for a given trading activity N , the larger the traded volume, the smaller the bid-ask spread (in
bp);
5 The ridge regression suggests that the feature being in N
V
(i.e. with no square root in front of the trading volume
in dollars), wit ha compensation by the avg price. This can be due to the penalization used by the Ridge regression
that avoids large coefficients in the regression.
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– for a given traded volume in dollars, the lower the average trade size (i.e. the more trades), the
large the bid-ask spread.
It is compatible with the documented stylized fact that for corporate bonds, small trade size obtain
a worse bid-ask spread than large trades [Fermanian et al., 2016].
• The value of the coupon and the duration of the corporate bond play a small role in the formation
of the bid-ask spread (both with a positive coefficient).
• Last but not least, the Number of years to maturity and the Years since issuance are selected by our
robust regressions. Keep in mind these two variables are linked, via the maturity of the bond, thanks
to the relation: Year to maturity = Maturity - Years since issuance. Hence naturally, the coefficient
of year to maturity is negative while the one of years since issuance is positive: the further away from
the maturity, the smaller the bid-ask spread (in bp). This could support the claim of some market
participants that there is only a short period after the issuance during which it is not too expensive
to trade them on secondary markets.
Other variables appearing in the OLS are not robust enough to be selected by penalized regressions. Re-
moving these 17 variables from the regression only reduces the R2 from around 0.55 to around 0.50. It is
a cheap cost to pay for the increased robustness.
Note that the R2 of these regressions are around 50%, that is in line with the best results obtained
in the academic literature: [Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012] obtained R2 between 0.50 and 0.80, while the R2 of
other papers were way below 0.50 (see Section 2).
5 Short time scale: price formation around transactions
5.1 Methodology: computing the price impact curve
Now we introduce the method to analyze the short term price impact on corporate bond market.
The key idea is to model different types of interactions between market participants so that price changes
consists of three parts: price changes due to RPT, price changes around clusters of transactions, and price
changes due to isolated trades. More specifically, following [Besson and Lehalle, 2014], we will differentiate
three types of transactions,
(R) potential“RPT” pair, which is a pair of orders with opposite signs and same volumes that are traded
within one minute, and of which at least one of the pair is dealer-costumer trade [Harris, 2015];
(C) “clustered” trade, if it is not a RPT and if the time between this trade and the adjacent ones is less
than one hour, i.e., |tk − tk−1| ≤ ∆T or |tk+1 − tk| ≤ ∆T . We choose ∆T as one hour because the
result is stable around such a duration;
(I) “isolated” trade, if the trade is isolated from all other trades in the database.
The intuition for the distinction of three parts is clear: price changes during RPTs tend to be of a
small amplitude, i.e., comparable to the bid-ask spread. Price changes during “clusters” of trades are
likely endogenous: these trades either come from the split of a large order, or are simply sequence of
trades reacting to each other; in fact some of them occur simply because the trading activity has attracted
traders’ attention. When two consecutive trades have very different prices and are separated by hours or
days, the price changes are likely endogenous: the difference in prices probably come from information on
the corporate, or via some intermediary trades on correlated instruments.
For a trading desk, it is presumably important to measure the performance of a series of trades or of one
trade belonging to a series with respect to their (or its) types. For example, different benchmarks should
be applied when the trades are inside a cluster versus when they are as riskless principal.
Now we are ready to calculate the price impact curves for clustered trades C with information from
{C,R}.
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Data description. We use the same 1993 bonds and the same Enhanced TRACE data over 24 months
from January 2015 to December 2016 as in Section 3.2 to calculate the price impact curves. Recall Table
15b for a statistical summary of the non-RPT Dealer-costumer trades in this dataset.
Denote δ = 5 (minutes) as the time interval between consecutive estimations in our analysis and Mb
tb
k
+nδ
(n ∈ N+) as the estimated mid-price at time tb,k + nδ using transactions with labels from T ∈ {C,R, I}.
Price impact curve. We now estimate the price changes one hour before and one hour after for each
transaction marked as C. That is, for each transaction time tbk (k is the number of the trade recorded for
bond b), we take the mid-price Mbk as a reference and compare it to the price n× 5 minute before or after
(i.e. n goes from -12 to +12). These averages are weighted by the value in dollars of the transaction number
k on the bond, and we take mb(tbk − nδ), where δ = 5 minutes, as the last mid-price before time tbk − nδ.
This allows to build a “price impact curve”: this average price change as a function of the time shift n. We
build one for buy orders:
C+(n) =
∑
b,k:b
k
=+1
V bk∑
b′,k′:b′
k′=+1
V k
′
b′
(
mb(tbk + nδ)−Mbk
) · bk
Mbk
,
and one for sell orders:
C−(n) =
∑
b,k:b
k
=−1
V bk∑
b′,k′:b′
k′=−1
V k
′
b′
(
mb(tbk + nδ)−Mbk
) · bk
Mbk
.
We will propose an alternative method to average the price change in Appendix D where the result is
consistent with the method proposed above.
Note that the multiple factor 10, 000 in the first approach is to ensure that C+(n) and C−(n) are roughly
the same scale as the basis point, and in the second approach the factor 100 is to ensure that 100 · φb,k is
roughly the same scale of Mb
tb
k
.
Figure 2: Price impact curves (confidence interval in dash-line).
5.2 Analysis of price impact curves: the buy/sell asymmetry
Figure 2 shows the price-impact asymmetry between customer-initiated buys and customer-initiated sells.
Recall that this asymmetry is first partially revealed in Table 10 for the OLS analysis: the coefficients of
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Prop number of buys and Prop number of sells are different. The coefficients of Prop volume buy and Prop
volume sell are also different. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that on average customer buys have a larger price
impact than customer sells.
This is not surprising: for several years after the financial crisis in 2011, there is a shortage in corporate
bond products [Bessembinder et al., 2018]. Dealers cannot maintain easily a desirable inventory level: the
conjunction of quantitative easing, demand in collateralization [Assefa et al., 2009], requirement for more
transparency on transactions, and the increase in required capital for inventory, lead to the reduced inventory
levels of dealers.
Price impact asymmetry verification. Given the asymmetry revealed in the price impact curves,
we now apply rigorous statistical tests to verify this finding.
For i ∈ {−12, · · · − 1, 1, · · · , 12}, define the populations P˜buy(i) and P˜sell(i),
P˜buy(i) :=

(
mb(tbk + iδ)−Mbtb
k
)
· bk
Mb
tb
k
: bk = 1

b,k
,
P˜sell(i) :=

(
mb(tbk + iδ)−Mbtk
b
)
· bk
Mb
tb
k
: bk = −1

b,k
.
We will apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, discussed below, to test if P˜sell(i) and P˜buy(i) have the
same distribution.
KS test for price impact asymmetry. KS test is a nonparametric test of the equality of continuous,
one-dimensional probability distributions that can be used to compare a sample with a reference probability
distribution (one-sample KS test), or to compare two samples (two-sample KS test).
In this analysis, we use the two-sample KS test. The mathematical formula for KS test is introduced in
Appendix E. In this case, the KS statistic quantifies a distance between the empirical distribution functions
of two samples. The null distribution of this statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that the
samples are drawn from the same distribution. The two-sample KS test is one of the most useful and
general nonparametric methods for comparing two samples, as it is sensitive to differences in both the
location and the shape of the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two samples. We first
calculate the empirical mean of population P˜buy(i) for each i,
Ebuy(i) :=
∑
x∈P˜buy(i)
x
|P˜buy(i)|
,
where |P˜buy(i)| is the cardinality of set P˜buy(i).
For any i ∈ {−12, · · · ,−1, 1, · · · , 12}, we run Kolmogorov test on the following two populations with
mean adjusted,
R˜buy(i) := P˜buy(i)− Ebuy(i)
=

(
mb(tbk + iδ)−Mbtb
k
)
Mb
tb
k
· bk − Ebuy(i) : bk = 1

b,k
,
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and
R˜sell(i) := P˜sell(i)− Ebuy(i)
=

(
mb(tbk + iδ)−Mbtb
k
)
Mb
tb
k
· bk − Ebuy(i) : k = −1

b,k
.
Table 19 in Appendix E shows the statistics of each population and p-values and Figure 3 shows the
p-values for each KS test. Table 19 and Figure 3 reject the hypothesis that the distributions of the two
samples are the same when i = 1, 2, 3 with 95% confidence. That is, the amplitudes of costumer-buy and
costumer-sell orders are different.
Figure 3: p-values for two-sample KS test.
5.3 Conclusion: using price impact curves for TCA
We have shown how to zoom at the level of each trade for corporate bonds that are liquid enough. It allows
to measure the price impact of a trade: the mid-price move due to the transaction. The implicit costs are
made of the conjunction of the bid-ask spread with the mid-price move, thus this analysis, in conjunction
with the one of Section 4, allows to conduct a full TCA on corporate bonds. In term of methodology, the
natural way to conduct a TCA is then:
1. For all corporate bonds, the asset manager or its dealing desk is to compute an expected bid-ask
spread given the characteristics of the bond and market conditions using one of the linear regression
proposed in Section 4.
2. This reference bid-ask spread can be used to benchmark the bid-ask spread obtained while requesting
a counterparty (typically a dealer) for quotes.
3. It can also be used to score all the obtained trades during the week.
4. Worst trades can then be qualitatively “valued” using the average price impact curves obtained in
the current section.
Moreover, our analysis sheds light on two main features of the price impact on corporate bonds:
• The asymmetry between buying and selling trades. We have identified that the mid price moves
triggered by a trade on corporate bond is larger for buying transactions than for selling ones. In
terms of TCA, it means that the asset manager has to expect such an asymmetry and take it into
consideration during the evaluation of its dealers.
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• Price impact curves exhibit decay, similar to the one identified on equity markets [Taranto et al., 2018].
The price impact curve is made of a jump corresponding to the adverse selection suffered by the dealer,
followed by a decay stabilizing the price at the level of the permanent market impact.
Disclaimer. It is important to keep in mind that corporate bonds have been traded electronically in
the past [Biais and Green, 2007], and that regulators have been pushing for more transparency both on the
post-trade and pre-trade sides. As a consequence, more tradings will probably be conducted on electronic
platforms. However, this paper is not meant to discuss if and/or when electronic trading will become
prominent for trading corporate bonds. Nor it is to discuss the advantage of upstairs RFQ tradings versus
centralized order books.
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Table 10: OLS Regression: the impact on bid-ask spread
Estimate Standard error t-value
Volatility 4.9159*** 0.020 251.687
Number of trade days −3.6648*** 0.203 −18.014
Prop number of buys 10.3189*** 0.689 14.971
Prop number of sells 32.4532*** 0.700 46.333
Trading activity 46.3169*** 0.531 87.162
Prop Volume sell $ 16.3523*** 0.608 26.893
Prop Volume buy $ 26.4198*** 0.642 41.155
Log(Total Volume ) −21.4028*** 0.272 −78.757
Avg price −0.1175*** 0.017 −6.723
Coupon −0.4707*** 0.120 −3.914
Duration 1.4168*** 0.148 9.596
Years to maturity −0.0656 0.076 −0.858
Years since issuance 1.2552*** 0.065 19.359
Turnover −1.7717 2.260 −0.784
LIBOR-OIS 34.0088*** 1.432 23.754
Indicator of high yield bonds 26.7859*** 0.595 45.039
Indicator of investment grade bonds 15.9861*** 0.604 26.461
Indicator of Basic Materials Sector 8.9009*** 0.661 13.462
Indicator of Communications Sector 5.1285*** 0.374 13.695
Indicator of Consumer, Cyclical Sector 4.0261*** 0.421 9.570
Indicator of Consumer, Non-cyclical Sector 4.9727*** 0.378 13.140
Indicator of Energy Sector 3.8824*** 0.362 10.731
Indicator of Financial Sector 4.0544*** 0.325 12.460
Indicator of Industrial Sector 2.8149*** 0.485 5.806
Indicator of Technology Sector 4.4085*** 0.489 9.017
Indicator of Utilities Sector 4.5836*** 1.116 4.107
Constant 42.7720*** 1.112 38.477
N 152,408
R2 55.4 %
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Two-tailed test.
Source: Enhanced TRACE(2015-2016).
25
Table 11: Two-step Lasso regression table: the impact on bid-ask spread (in bp)
Model OLS Model L1 Model L2 Model L3
All features λl = 1.13 λl = 2.98 λl = 7.85
Volatility 4.9159*** 5.1053*** 5.2836*** 5.4709***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Number of trade days −3.6648***
( 0.203)
Prop number of buys 10.3189***
(0.689)
Prop number of sells 32.4532***
(0.700)
Trading activity 46.3169*** 42.1450*** 39.0703***
(0.531) (0.451) (0.433)
Prop Volume sell $ 16.3523***
(0.608)
Prop Volume buy $ 26.4198***
(0.642)
Log(Total Volume ) −21.4028*** −21.1246***−19.4449***
(0.272) (0.252) (0.243)
Avg price −0.1175***
(0.017)
Coupon −0.4707*** 1.2071***
(0.120) (0.089)
Duration 1.4168*** 0.2453***
(0.148) (0.035)
Years to maturity −0.0643 −0.1078
(0.076) (0.075)
Years since issuance 1.2576*** −0.0216 0.2336*** 1.0396***
(0.065) (0.052) (0.046) (0.011)
Turnover −1.7717
(2.260)
(1.542)
LIBOR-OIS 34.0088***
(1.432)
Indicator of high yield bonds 26.7859***
( 0.595)
Indicator of investment grade bonds 15.9861***
(0.604)
Indicator of Basic Materials Sector 8.9009***
(0.661)
Indicator of Communications Sector 5.1285***
(0.374 )
Indicator of Consumer, Cyclical Sector 4.0261***
(0.421 )
Indicator of Consumer, Non-cyclical Sector 4.9727***
(0.378)
Indicator of Energy Sector 3.8824***
(0.362)
Indicator of Financial Sector 4.0544***
(0.325 )
Indicator of Industrial Sector 2.8149***
(0.485)
Indicator of Technology Sector 4.4085***
(0.489)
Indicator of Utilities Sector 4.5836***
(1.116 )
Constant 42.7720 86.1737 85.6982 −2.9270
N 152,408 152,408 152,408 152,408
R2 55.4 % 52.8 % 51.5 % 43.22 %
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Two-tailed test.
Source: Enhanced TRACE(2015-2016).
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Table 12: Ridge regression table: the impact on bid-ask spread (in bp)
Model OLS Model R1 Model R2 Model R3
All features λr = 1.62× 104 λr = 6.95× 104 λr = 1.27× 106
Volatility 4.9159*** 5.1910*** 5.3147*** 4.7510***
(0.020) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of trade days −3.6648*** 1.1389*** 1.2833*** 0.1705
( 0.202) (0.339) (0.241) (0.249)
Prop number of buys 10.3189*** −3.5702*** −1.1382 −0.0734
(0.689) (1.148) ( 0.817) (0.844 )
Prop number of sells 32.4532*** 3.5702*** 1.1382 0.0734
(0.700) (1.167) (0.830) (0.858)
Trading activity 46.3169*** 14.2859*** 4.3609*** 0.2794
(0.531) (0.885) (0.630 ) (0.651)
Prop Volume sell $ 16.3523*** −0.7126 −0.0237 0.0060
(0.608) (1.013) (0.720) (0.745)
Prop Volume buy $ 26.4198*** 0.7126 0.0237 −0.0060
(0.642) (1.069) (0.761) (0.786)
Log(Total Volume ) −21.4028*** −10.5886*** −4.5781*** −0.4096
(0.272) (0.453) (0.322 ) (0.333 )
Avg price −0.1175*** −0.1313*** −0.0896*** −0.2174***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021)
Coupon −0.4707*** 0.0114 −0.0264 0.2436
(0.120) (0.200) (0.142) (0.147)
Duration 1.4168*** 1.7553*** 0.0044*** 0.2660
(0.1480) (0.246) (0.003) (0.181)
Years to maturity −0.0643 −0.6328*** −0.5433*** 0.0510
(0.076) (0.127) ( 0.091) (0.094)
Years since issuance 1.2576*** 1.0926*** 1.0705*** 0.6555***
(0.065) (0.108) (0.077) (0.079)
Turnover −1.7717 −0.0963 −0.0893 −0.0120
(2.260) (3.764) (2.677) (2.768)
(0.012) (0.002) (0.029) (0.018)
LIBOR-OIS 34.008 *** 2.5574 0.6844 0.0386
(1.432) (2.384) (1.696) (1.753)
Indicator of high yield bonds 26.7859*** 1.8302* 0.5512 0.0478
(0.595) (0.990) ( 0.716) (0.728)
Indicator of investment grade bonds 15.9861*** −1.8302* −0.5512 −0.0478
(0.604) (1.006) (0.012) (0.740)
Indicator of Basic Materials Sector 8.9009*** 0.6401 0.1724 0.0125
(0.661) (1.101) (0.783) (0.810)
Indicator of Communications Sector 5.1285*** 0.7563 0.3777 0.0373
(0.374) (0.624) (0.444) (0.459 )
Indicator of Consumer, Cyclical Sector 4.0261*** −0.5567 −0.2340 −0.0256
(0.421) (0.701) (0.498 ) (0.515 )
Indicator of Consumer, Non-cyclical Sector 4.9727*** −0.4812 −0.2448 −0.0371
(0.378) (0.630) (0.448 ) (0.463 )
Indicator of Energy Sector 3.882 *** −1.3953** −0.7044* −0.0304
(0.362) (0.603) (0.429 ) (0.433)
Indicator of Financial Sector 4.0544*** 0.1134 0.0911 −0.0054
(0.325 ) (0.542) (0.385) (0.398)
Indicator of Industrial Sector 2.8149*** −0.1199 0.0657 0.0130
(0.485) (0.807) (0.574) (0.594 )
Indicator of Technology Sector 4.4085*** 1.0098 0.4649 0.0346
(0.489 ) (0.814) (0.579 ) (0.599)
Indicator of Utilities Sector 4.5836*** 0.0335 0.0114 0.001
(1.116) (1.859) (1.322) (1.367)
Constant 42.7720 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 152,408 152,408 152,408 152,408
R2 55.4 % 53.5 % 52.0 % 50.0 %
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Two-tailed test.
Source: Enhanced TRACE(2015-2016).
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Table 13: Two-step EN regression table: the impact on bid-ask spread (in bp)
Model OLS Model EN1 Model EN2 Model EN3
All features (α, λe) = (0.5, 0.774) (α, λe) = (0.8, 2.15) (α, λe) = (0.5, 129)
Volatility 4.9159*** 4.9206*** 5.2836*** 5.5365***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016)
Number of trade days −3.6648*** −3.3792***
( 0.203) ( 0.200)
Prop number of buys 10.3189*** 20.4300***
(0.689) (0.725)
Prop number of sells 32.4532*** 36.5251
(0.700) (0.732)
Trading activity 46.3169*** 45.9632*** 39.0703***
(0.531) (0.519) (0.433)
Prop Volume sell 16.3523***
(0.608)
Prop Volume buy 26.4198***
(0.642)
Log(Total Volume ) −21.4028*** −21.6955*** −19.4449***
(0.272) (0.252) (0.243)
Avg price −0.1175*** −0.1083*** 0.1264***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Coupon −0.4707***
(0.120)
Duration 1.4168*** 1.5875***
(0.148) (0.146)
Years to maturity −0.0643 −0.1680
(0.076) (0.074)
Years since issuance 1.2576*** 0.9346*** 0.2336***
(0.065) (0.056) (0.046)
Turnover −1.7717
(2.260)
(1.542)
LIBOR-OIS 34.0088***
(1.432)
Indicator of high yield bonds 26.7859*** 33.1587***
( 0.595) ( 0.650)
Indicator of investment grade bonds 15.9861*** 23.7964***
(0.604) (0.625)
Indicator of Basic Materials Sector 8.9009***
(0.661)
Indicator of Communications Sector 5.1285***
(0.374 )
Indicator of Consumer, Cyclical Sector 4.0261***
(0.421 )
Indicator of Consumer, Non-cyclical Sector 4.9727***
(0.378)
Indicator of Energy Sector 3.8824***
(0.362)
Indicator of Financial Sector 4.0544***
(0.325 )
Indicator of Industrial Sector 2.8149***
(0.485)
Indicator of Technology Sector 4.4085***
(0.489)
Indicator of Utilities Sector 4.5836***
(1.116 )
Constant 42.7720 56.9551 85.6982 −12.7213
N 152,408 152,408 152,408 152,408
R2 55.4 % 53.8 % 51.5 % 42.62 %
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Two-tailed test.
Source: Enhanced TRACE(2015-2016).
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Appendices
A Assigning a sign to a trade and identifying RPT
To estimate the sign of transactions, we will first reproduce the essentials of preprocessing to identify such
RPTs in [Harris, 2015]. We identify potential RPTs as pairs of sequentially adjacent trades of the same
size for which one trade is a customer trade. To find these trades in the Enhanced TRACE data, we first
identify all size runs (sequences) of two or more trades of equal size. Next, for each size run, we consider
which trades, if any, consist of a pair of trades in a potential RPT. We identify potential RPTs if one trade
of two adjacent trades within a size run is a dealer trade with a customer, or if both trades in an adjacent
pair are customer trades and the dealer both buys and sells. We identify the first such pair as a potential
RPT, and then continue searching the size run for any additional pairs that do not involve trades already
identified as being part of a potential RPT. [Harris, 2015] found that the RPT rate is above 42%; and 41%
of customer trade throughs appear to be RPTs. The RPT rate for our whole Enhanced TRACE data set
is 23.9%. Moreover, Table 14a shows we found 21.8% RPTs.
Total Dealer-customer Dealer-dealer
Total number 9,413,109 4,523,268 4,889,841
Number of RPT 2,052,644 1,145,127 907,517
Percentage of RPT 21.8% 25.3% 18.5%
(a) Statistics of potential RPTs for selected 1,993 bonds.
Total Customer-buy Customer-sell
Total number 3,378,141 1,921,608 1,456,533
Number percentage 100% 57% 43%
Total volume 3.10× 1012 1.73× 1012 1.37× 1012
Volume percentage 100% 55.8% 44.2%
(b) Statistics of non-RPT dealer-customer trades.
Table 14: Statistics of selected 1,993 bonds for the BA-spread
regression.
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Total Dealer-customer Dealer-dealer
Total number 7,671,644 3,574,264 4,097,380
Number of RPT 1,723,516 945,946 777,570
Percentage of RPT 22.4% 26.4% 18.9%
(a) Distribution of potential RPTs.
Total Customer-buy Customer-sell
Total number 2,628,318 1,502,653 1,125,665
Number percentage 100% 57% 43%
Total volume 2.06× 1012 1.14× 1012 9.26× 1011
Volume percentage 100% 55.4% 44.6%
(b) Distribution of non-RPT Dealer-customer trades.
Table 15: Statistics of selected 1,000 bonds for the price impact
analysis.
B ANOVA test and Kruskal-Wallis H-test
Suppose there are W groups of observations. (In our example, W = 6.) There are nw numbers of obser-
vations in group w and the total number among all groups is n. Within each group w = 1, 2, · · · ,W , the
observations are denoted as yw,1, · · · , yw,nw with sample size nw. Denote y¯w =
∑nw
i=1 yw,i
nw
as the sample
mean in group w and y¯ =
∑W
w=1
∑nw
i=1 yw,i
n
as the sample mean of all observations.
One-way ANOVA test. One-way ANOVA test is applied to samples from two or more groups, possibly
with differing sizes. In one-way ANOVA test, the formula for F-ratio is F = MSB
MSW
, where MSB =∑J
j=1 nj(y¯j−y¯)2
n−1 is the between-group mean square value and MSW =
∑J
j=1
∑nj
i=1(yj,i−y¯j)2
n(n−1)
W
is the within-
group mean square value.
Kruskal-Wallis H-test. The Kruskal-Wallis H-test is a non-parametric version of ANOVA. The test
works on two or more independent samples, which may have different sizes. The mathematical formula for
H-statistic is
H =
12
n(n+ 1)
W∑
j=1
T 2j
nj
− 3(n+ 1),
where Tj is the sum of ranks in the j
th group.
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C Cross-validation results
Lasso.
Figure 4: Cross-validation score for Lasso.
λl 1.0× 10−1 1.62× 10−1 2.64× 10−1 4.28× 10−1 6.95× 10−1
R̂2 0.550 0.549 0.547 0.544 0.541
Number in I1 15 12 12 14 15
Number in I2 152 153 155 156 157
λl 1.13 1.83 2.98 4.83 7.85
R̂2 0.527 0.517 0.507 0.505 0.484
Number in I1 18 16 16 16 14
Number in I2 158 160 161 161 162
λl 1.27× 10 2.07× 10 3.36× 10 5.46× 10 8.86× 10
R̂2 0.484 0.483 0.481 0.477 0.464
Number in I1 14 16 13 16 16
Number in I2 160 161 161 160 158
λl 1.44× 102 2.34× 102 3.79× 102 6.16× 102 1.00× 103
R̂2 0.442 0.364 0.133 -0.001 -0.001
Number of R˜2 in CI(λl) 17 13 16 8 8
Number of R˜2 in CI2(λl) 155 149 149 175 175
Table 16: Number of R˜2 in the confidence interval for Lasso.
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Ridge.
Figure 5: Cross-validation score for Ridge.
λr 1.00× 102 2.07× 102 4.28× 102 8.85× 102 1.83× 103
R̂2 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.550 0.549
Number in I1 9 9 11 9 11
Number in I2 168 167 166 166 166
λr 3.79× 103 7.84× 103 1.62× 104 3.36× 104 6.95× 104
R̂2 0.546 0.540 0.533 0.524 0.518
Number in I1 11 14 15 13 11
Number in I2 168 169 170 172 173
λr 1.44× 105 2.98× 105 6.16× 105 1.27× 106 2.64× 106
R̂2 0.513 0.509 0.506 0.500 0.485
Number in I1 11 11 13 17 11
Number in I2 172 171 171 167 164
λr 5.46× 106 1.23× 107 2.34× 107 4.83× 107 1.00× 108
R̂2 0.448 0.381 0.287 0.188 0.109
Number in I1 8 8 6 7 7
Number in I2 159 149 143 136 136
Table 17: Number of R˜2 in the confidence interval for Ridge re-
gression.
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EN.
(a) α = 0.2 (b) α = 0.5 (c) α = 0.8
Figure 6: Cross-validation score for EN.
α = 0.2, λe =1.0× 10−1 2.78× 10−1 7.74× 10−1 2.15 5.99 1.68× 10 4.64× 101.29× 1023.59× 1021.00× 103
R̂2 0.537 0.526 0.516 0.510 0.505 0.494 0.450 0.340 0.178 0.048
I1 15 16 15 13 12 9 2 16 11 13
I2 161 160 160 160 159 152 150 133 137 142
α = 0.5, λe =1.0× 10−1 2.78× 10−17.74× 10−1 2.15 5.99 1.68× 10 4.64× 10 1.29× 1023.59× 1021.00× 103
R̂2 0.542 0.530 0.518 0.50100.505 0.498 0.470 0.368 0.169 -0.001
I1 16 16 17 11 12 13 9 17 12 16
I2 160 162 163 161 160 158 154 154 138 174
α = 0.8, λe =1.0× 10−1 2.78× 10−1 7.74× 10−1 2.15 5.99 1.68× 10 4.64× 101.29× 1023.59× 1021.00× 103
R̂2 0.547 0.538 0.524 0.508 0.504 0.502 0.487 0.417 0.170 -0.001
I1 16 16 15 17 12 13 10 9 12 16
I2 159 160 160 162 159 160 158 147 139 174
Table 18: Number of R˜2 in confidence interval for EN.
D Price impact curve
Method 2:
• C2,+(n) = ∑b,k:b
k
=1
V bk∑
b′,k′ V b
′
k′
(
mb(tbk+nδ)−Mbtk
b
)
·bk
φb
k
× 100 ,
• C2,−(n) = ∑b,k:b
k
=−1
V bk∑
b′,k′ V b
′
k′
(
mb(tbk+nδ)−Mbtb
k
)
·bk
φb
k
× 100 .
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Figure 7: Price impact curves under method 2 (confidence interval in dash-line).
E KS test
Mathematically, denote by F (x) = P(X1 ≤ x) a cumulative density function of a true underlying distribution
of the data, and define an empirical cumulative density function by
Fn(x) = Pn(X ≤ x) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi ≤ x),
which counts the proportion of the samples points below level x. For any fixed point x ∈ R the law of large
numbers implies that
Fn(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi ≤ x)→ E[I(X ≤ x)] = P(X1 ≤ x) = F (x).
That is, the proportion of the sample in the set (−∞, x] approximates the probability of this set. In fact
this approximation holds uniformly over all x ∈ R. That is,
sup
x∈R
|Fn(x)− F (x)| → 0,
Suppose that the first sample X1, X2, · · · , Xm of size m has a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (x),
and the second sample Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn of size n has a CDF G(x). Suppose that one wants to test
H0 : F = G vs. H1 : F 6= G.
Let Fm(x) and Gn(x) be their respective empirical CDFs, then
Dmn =
(
mn
(m+ n)
) 1
n
sup
x
|Fm(x)−Gn(x)|
satisfies the following property of convergence in distribution:
P (|Dmn| < t)→ H(t) = 1− 2
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i−1e−2i2t
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where H(t) is the CDF of the KS distribution.
i -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
|R˜buy(i)| 3068 4050 3977 4304 4185 4403 5598 5507 5613 5867 5423 13482
|R˜sell(i)| 1894 2071 2063 2322 2327 2606 3087 2876 3016 3325 3701 7261
p-value 0.105 0.230 0.137 0.0347 0.006 0.0178 0.040 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.017
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
|R˜buy(i)| 10607 7429 5494 3524 3421 3079 3136 2909 2888 2346 2776 2399
|R˜sell(i)| 6356 3801 3777 3635 3124 2912 2819 2870 2599 2515 2258 2354
p-value 0.002 0.008 0.012 0.029 0.027 0.007 0.002 0.142 0.077 0.017 0.019 0.004
Table 19: Number of observations and p-values of KS test.
References
[Akaike, 1997] Akaike, H. (1997). Selected Papers of Hirotugu Akaike (Springer Series in Statistics / Per-
spectives in Statistics). Springer, 1 edition.
[Albanese and Tompaidis, 2008] Albanese, C. and Tompaidis, S. (2008). Small transaction cost asymptotics
and dynamic hedging. European Journal of Operational Research, 185(3):1404–1414.
[Almgren et al., 2005] Almgren, R., Thum, C., Hauptmann, E., and Li, H. (2005). Direct estimation of
equity market impact. Risk, 18:57–62.
[Asquith et al., 2013] Asquith, P., Au, A. S., Covert, T., and Pathak, P. A. (2013). The market for bor-
rowing corporate bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(1):155–182.
[Assefa et al., 2009] Assefa, S., Bielecki, T. R., Cre´pey, S., and Jeanblanc, M. (2009). CVA computation
for counterparty risk assessment in credit portfolios. Preprint.
[Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2013] Belloni, A. and Chernozhukov, V. (2013). Least squares after model
selection in high-dimensional sparse models. Bernoulli, 19(2):521–547.
[Bessembinder et al., 2008] Bessembinder, Hendrik, Maxwell, and William (2008). Markets transparency
and the corporate bond market. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2):217–234.
[Bessembinder et al., 2018] Bessembinder, H., Jacobsen, S., Maxwell, W., and Venkataraman, K. (2018).
Capital commitment and illiquidity in corporate bonds. The Journal of Finance, 73(4):1615–1661.
[Bessembinder et al., 2006] Bessembinder, H., Maxwell, W., and Venkataraman, K. (2006). Market trans-
parency, liquidity externalities, and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds. Journal of Financial
Economics, 82(2):251–288.
[Besson and Lehalle, 2014] Besson, P. and Lehalle, C.-A. (2014). The deal/book split analysis: A new
method to disentangle the contribution to market and limit orders in any price change.
[Biais et al., 2016] Biais, B., Declerck, F., and Moinas, S. (2016). Who supplies liquidity, how and when?
Technical report, BIS Working Paper.
[Biais and Green, 2007] Biais, B. and Green, R. C. (2007). The microstructure of the bond market in the
20th century. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University.
[Borovkov, 1998] Borovkov, A. A. (1998). Mathematical Statistics. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.
[Chacko et al., 2005] Chacko, G., Mahanti, S., Mallik, G., and Subrahmanyam, M. G. (2005). The deter-
minants of liquidity in the corporate bond markets: An application of latent liquidity.
35
[Chakravarty and Sarkar, 2003] Chakravarty, S. and Sarkar, A. (2003). Trading costs in three US bond
markets. The Journal of Fixed Income, 13(1):39–48.
[Che´telat et al., 2017] Che´telat, D., Lederer, J., Salmon, J., et al. (2017). Optimal two-step prediction in
regression. Electronic Journal of Statistics, 11(1):2519–2546.
[Chordia et al., 2005] Chordia, T., Sarkar, A., and Subrahmanyam, A. (2005). An empirical analysis of
stock and bond market liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 18(1):85–129.
[Collins and Fabozzi, 1991] Collins, B. M. and Fabozzi, F. J. (1991). A methodology for measuring trans-
action costs. Financial Analysts Journal, 47(2):27–36.
[Dick-Nielsen, 2014] Dick-Nielsen, J. (2014). How to clean Enhanced TRACE data. Available at SSRN
2337908.
[Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012] Dick-Nielsen, J., Feldhu¨tter, P., and Lando, D. (2012). Corporate bond liquidity
before and after the onset of the subprime crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(3):471–492.
[Edwards et al., 2007] Edwards, A. K., Harris, L. E., and Piwowar, M. S. (2007). Corporate bond market
transaction costs and transparency. The Journal of Finance, 62(3):1421–1451.
[Efron et al., 2004] Efron, B., Hastie, T., Johnstone, I., Tibshirani, R., et al. (2004). Least angle regression.
The Annals of Statistics, 32(2):407–499.
[Engle et al., 2012] Engle, R. F., Ferstenberg, R., and Russell, J. R. (2012). Measuring and modeling
execution cost and risk. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 38(2):14–28.
[Eom et al., 2004] Eom, Y. H., Helwege, J., and Huang, J.-Z. (2004). Structural models of corporate bond
pricing: An empirical analysis. Review of Financial Studies, 17(2):499–544.
[Fermanian et al., 2016] Fermanian, J.-D., Gue´ant, O., and Pu, J. (2016). The behavior of dealers and
clients on the european corporate bond market: the case of multi-dealer-to-client platforms. Market
Microstructure and Liquidity, page 1750004.
[Fermanian et al., 2015] Fermanian, J.-D., Gue´ant, O., and Rachez, A. (2015). Agents’ Behavior on Multi-
Dealer-to-Client Bond Trading Platforms.
[Friewald and Nagler, 2014] Friewald, N. and Nagler, F. (2014). Dealer inventory and the cross-section of
corporate bond returns. Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series.
[Gine´, 1997] Gine´, E. (1997). Lectures on some aspects of the bootstrap. In Gine´, E., Grimmett, G. R.,
Coste, L. S., and Bernard, P., editors, Ecole d’e´te´ de Probabilite´s de Saint-Flour, XXVI, volume 1665 of
Lecture Notes in Math, pages 37–152. Springer Verlag.
[Glosten and Milgrom, 1985] Glosten, L. R. and Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, ask and transaction prices in a
specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1):71–100.
[Goldstein et al., 2007] Goldstein, M. A., Hotchkiss, E. S., and Sirri, E. R. (2007). Transparency and
liquidity: A controlled experiment on corporate bonds. Review of Financial Studies, 20(2):235–273.
[Harris, 2015] Harris, L. (2015). Transaction costs, trade throughs, and riskless principal trading in corpo-
rate bond markets. Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series.
[Hendershott and Madhavan, 2015] Hendershott, T. and Madhavan, A. (2015). Click or call? auction
versus search in the over-the-counter market. The Journal of Finance, 70(1):419–447.
[Hoerl and Kennard, 1970] Hoerl, A. E. and Kennard, R. W. (1970). Ridge regression: applications to
nonorthogonal problems. Technometrics, 12(1):69–82.
[Horel, 1962] Horel, A. (1962). Application of ridge analysis to regression problems. Chemical Engineering
Progress, 58:54–59.
[Hull et al., 2005] Hull, J. C., Nelken, I., and White, A. (2005). Merton’s model, credit risk and volatility
skews. Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series.
36
[Kass and Wasserman, 1995] Kass, R. E. and Wasserman, L. (1995). A reference bayesian test for nested
hypotheses and its relationship to the schwarz criterion. Journal of the american statistical association,
90(431):928–934.
[Kissell et al., 2004] Kissell, R., Glantz, M., and Malamut, R. (2004). A practical framework for estimating
transaction costs and developing optimal trading strategies to achieve best execution. Finance Research
Letters, 1(1):35–46.
[Konstantinovsky et al., 2016] Konstantinovsky, V., Ng, K. Y., and Phelps, B. D. (2016). Measuring bond-
level liquidity. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(4):116.
[Lederer, 2013] Lederer, J. (2013). Trust, but verify: benefits and pitfalls of least-squares refitting in high
dimensions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1306.0113.
[Linciano et al., 2014] Linciano, N., Fancello, F., Gentile, M., and Modena, M. (2014). The liquidity
of dual-listed corporate bonds. empirical evidence from italian markets. Technical report, CONSOB.
italy14bonds.
[Mizrach, 2015] Mizrach, B. (2015). Analysis of corporate bond liquidity. Technical report, FINRA.
[Nagel, 2016] Nagel, J. (2016). Electronic trading in fixed income markets. Technical report, NBIS.
[Ruzza, 2016] Ruzza, A. (2016). Agency issues in corporate bond trading. Technical report, SSRN.
[Schultz, 2001] Schultz, P. (2001). Corporate bond trading costs: A peek behind the curtain. The Journal
of Finance, 56(2):677–698.
[Stoll, 1978] Stoll, H. R. (1978). The supply of dealer services in securities markets. The Journal of Finance,
33(4):1133–1151.
[Taranto et al., 2018] Taranto, D. E., Bormetti, G., Bouchaud, J.-P., Lillo, F., and To´th, B. (2018). Linear
models for the impact of order flow on prices. i. history dependent impact models. Quantitative Finance,
18(6):903–915.
[Tibshirani, 1996a] Tibshirani, R. (1996a). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 267–288.
[Tibshirani, 1996b] Tibshirani, R. (1996b). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 267–288.
[Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019] Van Kervel, V. and Menkveld, A. (2019). High-frequency trading around
large institutional orders. Journal of Finance.
[Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971] Vapnik, V. N. and Chervonenkis, A. Y. (1971). On the uniform conver-
gence of relative frequencies of events to their probabilities. Theory of Probability and its Applications,
16(2):264–280.
[Wilson et al., 2014] Wilson, D., Trivedi, K., Weisberger, N., Karoui, L., Timcenko, A., Ursua, J., Cole, G.,
and Yin, S. (2014). The state of play in the leveraged finance market: Ok for now. Technical Report 33,
Global Economics Weekly.
[Zou and Hastie, 2005] Zou, H. and Hastie, T. (2005). Regularization and variable selection via the elastic
net. In Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, pages 301–320.
37
